King Gustav V of Sweden was an avowed Germanophile, as was many of his family. His late wife, the strong-willed Queen Victoria of Sweden, had after all been born a Princess of Baden and was both the granddaughter of Emperor Wilhelm I, as well as a cousin of Emperor Wilhelm II. Furthermore, the marriage was primarily a political alliance organised by Gustav’s father, King Oscar II, who was keen to forge strong ties with Germany. Victoria’s influence over her rather hesitant husband was considerable and was still evident in the years following her death in 1930. The latter’s cousin, Prince Maximilian von Baden, who died in 1929, was another influence. He had long emphasised to Gustav that Germany and Sweden had common interests against Russia. In 1915, during the Great War ‘Max’ even travelled to Drottningholm in an (ultimately futile) attempt to bring Sweden into the war on the German side. Another relative of the Swedish Queen, her second cousin Prince Victor of Wied was to serve as a counsellor in the German Legation in Stockholm between 1919-1922. In 1933, and by now a member of the National Socialist Workers’ Party, he returned to the Swedish capital in the powerful and influential post of German Minister. Wied-who was a friend of Hermann Göring-continued to foster relations between Sweden and Germany, not least through the King and members of the German and Swedish aristocracy, who were traditionally pro-German. It so happened that Göring’s Swedish first wife Carin, had been high-born. (Although she died in 1931, Carin would open up contacts on behalf of her husband which were still in use during World War 2.) It also helped that Gustav’s grandson (and heir-but-one to the Swedish throne) Gustav Adolf, had married the German Princess Sybilla of Coburg the previous year. Her English-born father, Charles Edward, the Duke of Coburg, was a staunch supporter of Hitler and the Nazi Regime and had contacts at the highest level in Berlin. He was also a friend of Victor of Wied. Unsurprisingly, in 1933, during a visit to Berlin, Gustav entertained the President of Germany and the newly-elected Chancellor, Adolf Hitler to lunch at the Swedish Legation. Meanwhile, in February 1939, the King paid another visit to Berlin, during which he conferred on Field Marshal Göring, a Commander Grand Cross of the Royal Order of the Sword, a distinguished Swedish military award.

However, when World War II commenced in September 1939, the Swedish government of Per Albin Hansson adopted a neutral stance, a view endorsed by King Gustav. Nevertheless, this would prove a difficult position to maintain and was to come at a price. The first challenge was when Germany invaded Sweden’s neighbours of Norway and Denmark on 9 April 1940. Gustav received news of this by telephone, just after 5am, from his Foreign Minister, Christian Günther. The latter had been informed of the dual invasions in person at his home on Ymervägen in Djursholm, only a few minutes earlier, by the German Minister in Stockholm, Prince Victor of Wied. The latter had been at pains to reassure Günther that Sweden, unlike Norway and Denmark, would not be invaded (subject to certain conditions) and that he would soon be in a position to hand over an official communication from Berlin which would elaborate on the German government’s position. Wied was as good as his word and, by 9am, a collection of notables, including the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Crown Prince, joined the King in his study at the Royal Palace to discuss Germany’s demands. It made uncomfortable reading: Firstly, Sweden was not allowed to mobilise its forces. Secondly, the Swedish navy must at all times not hinder German naval operations nor travel further than three miles from the Swedish coast. Neither was Sweden to impede German official telecommunications traffic. Of particular importance to the German war effort, deliveries of Swedish iron ore were to continue unhindered, with the mines to be protected against Allied sabotage attempts.

It would be fair to say that each person sitting round the table was fearful of the Nazi menace. They had no reason to doubt that if they did not agree to these terms, Hitler’s troops would soon be marching down the streets of Stockholm. Indeed, only the sceptical Crown Prince-who had previously been married to Britain’s Princess Margaret of Connaught and was currently married to the British-raised Louise Mountbatten (who outspokenly compared Nazism to Barbarism)-spoke out against acceptance of these conditions. Eventually, it was agreed to accept the German’s demands with one exception: Sweden would not agree to being prohibited from mobilising its forces. On April 19, King Gustav V wrote a personal letter to Hitler ‘affirming the intention of Sweden to maintain strictest neutrality and to resist the violation of Sweden’s frontiers by any powers.’ Hitler replied within days reaffirming Germany’s intention to respect Sweden’s neutrality unconditionally. But, as shall be seen, these words were merely diplomatic platitudes.

However, even as he signed his letter to Hitler, Gustav V was already dealing with several dilemmas. The first was when his niece, Crown Princess Märtha of Norway, seeking to avoid capture by German occupying forces, travelled from Elverum across the border into Sweden with her three children in the early hours of 10 April. None of the party had passports but eventually the border guards let them through. Unsure of the reception she would receive from her Swedish relations, the Crown Princess then proceeded to the Högfjällshotell in the ski resort of Sälen where she was joined by her mother, the Danish-born Princess Ingeborg, who was no fan of the Germans, who had recently invaded her homeland.

No sooner had Gustav received word of Märtha ’s arrival when another crisis crossed his desk. An exhausted King Haakon and Crown Prince Olav, who had remained in Norway but refused to cooperate with the Nazis, were currently being hounded by a crack group of 120 German commandos bent on their capture or death. They had reached the Swedish border post near Flötningen, on 12 April. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvdan Koht, telephoned his Swedish counterpart, Christian Günther, seeking a guarantee that King Haakon might be allowed to cross over into Sweden and cross back safely after a night’s rest at a hostel. Günther discussed the matter with King Gustav. The reply was brisk and uncompromising: ‘The Swedish government does not want to provide guarantees regarding return travel in advance.’ It was also indicated that under international law, if the Norwegian King and his party crossed the border in military uniform, they would be interned. This response was to earn Gustav the lasting enmity of King Haakon.

Meanwhile, the situation with Crown Princess Märtha was also mishandled by King Gustav. Märtha was moved on from Sälen, as it was feared her presence so close to the Norwegian border might provoke the Germans, but as to doing exactly what remains unclear. “Uncle Gustav”, after initially welcoming Märtha and her family to his home at Drottningholm (where an adjutant warned that the war was not to be discussed at the dinner table) eventually offered her accommodation at nearby Ulriksdal Palace. Interestingly, the move to his palace coincided with King Haakon learning that the Germans had informed the Administrative Council, an interim body appointed by the Norwegian Supreme Court to deal with matters of civil administration in Norway, that he should abdicate the throne. Furthermore, during this period the Crown Princess (who received little direct news of King Haakon and her husband Olav) was subject to constant political pressure to return to Norway with her son Prince Harald and cooperate with the occupying power by acting as Regent, of what would effectively be a puppet throne, until her son reached his majority. A number of prominent Norwegians who visited Stockholm advocated for such a solution. This idea also had its supporters within Per Albin Hansson’s Swedish government. For instance, the Swedish Justice Minister (and one-time Foreign Minister), Karl Westman, wrote in his diary as early as 19 June, mentioning his attendance at a government meeting: ‘I reiterated my question about why the friends of the Norwegian dynasty do not put the Norwegian crown princess and [prince] Harald on a plane and send them… to Oslo.’ He was writing this at a time when many Swedes believed that Märtha’s presence threatened to undermine Sweden’s neutrality when Germany was on the ascendance: Only a few days earlier German forces had entered Paris unopposed and the French were on the point of signing the surrender at Compiègne. Meanwhile, some Norwegians even harboured the-not unrealistic-suspicion that Prince Harald could be kidnapped and taken to Oslo by force.

King Gustav, meanwhile, was concerned to learn of the German’s desire to have King Haakon abdicate or even to depose the monarchy in Norway. He now chose to become personally involved and in a telegram to Hitler observed, ‘I consider it my duty to personally emphasize to you, Herr Reich Chancellor, that such a measure would elicit serious disapproval among the broadest circles of the Swedish people and throughout the whole of Scandinavia. I wish therefore, before irrevocable decisions are made by you, to draw your attention through this telegram…to urge you, Mr. Chancellor, to proceed with all the moderation that can be considered possible in relation to Norway, its king and people.’ Did he now fear for his own throne?

Rumours now began to circulate of a cipher telegram having been sent on 21 June by King Gustav to King Haakon to advise him to abdicate in favour of his grandson as ‘a means of saving the Norwegian people from unnecessary difficulties’. This led to confusion and it appears that the contents of King Gustav’s earlier telegram to Hitler was somehow misconstrued or misreported for, on 22 June the British Minister in Stockholm indicated that King Gustav had telegraphed Hitler directly personally recommending the Regency option to him. Thus, London (and the Crown Princess) now believed that Gustav was the principal protagonist in this “Norwegian Regency” matter. Indeed, such was the fury in London that it caused Britain’s King George VI to sit down and write a very stern letter to the Swedish King. Fortunately, this was not forwarded by the British Legation in Stockholm to King Gustav, when it became clear that in his earlier telegram to Hitler the meddling Swedish king had instead urged the Reich Chancellor to show the utmost possible moderation in his dealings over Norway. Some commentators have taken the view that Gustav intervened simply because he believed that if the matter was not resolved soon Germany would abolish the monarchy in Norway. Ironically, Hitler would interpret Gustav’s involvement as a Norwegian-inspired attempt to put pressure on Germany.

Märtha was clearly aware of the growing danger and sent a telegram to London warning her husband and father-in-law ( who had fled there, in early June, with members of the legitimate Norwegian government) that her Swedish family (i.e. King Gustav) and Hitler were conspiring to remove King Haakon and set up a Regency. Crown Prince Olav had never felt his family were safe in Sweden and in a letter from Buckingham Palace dated 22 June, he appraised his old friend President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the situation. The President soon came to Märtha’s rescue and offered her and her children the chance to relocate to the United States as his ‘personal guests.’ They departed Ulriksdal on 12 August and sailed from the Finnish port of Petsamo (now Petsjenga, Russia) aboard the USS American Legion on 15 August. Olav’s intervention, of course, thwarted the regency option. King Gustav seemed displeased by this latest development and telegraphed King Haakon, on 24 July, stating that he objected to the American trip as it might undermine the future of the Norwegian monarchy, a viewpoint Haakon quickly dismissed.

Not content with concerning himself with Norwegian matters, Gustav V turned his hand to acting as a peacemaker between Germany and the United Kingdom. He wrote personally to Britain’s King George VI, as well as to Hitler offering his services as an intermediary for peace. What the Fuhrer replied is unclear but George VI handed a note to the Swedish Ambassador in London on 12 August which courteously but firmly rejected Gustav’s offer, pointing out that ‘the intention of My Peoples to prosecute the war until their purposes have been achieved has been strengthened’ as a result of the felonious behaviour of the Germans in the war so far.

Meanwhile, as the above sagas were being played out, King Gustav was also faced with an even more pressing problem within days of the occupation of Norway: A German request to transport food rations, medical staff and nursing supplies through Sweden by train to Narvik in northern Norway. This port was the primary outlet, particularly in winter, for transporting the Swedish ore by sea to Germany. The Swedish government agreed to this request on 17 April. It was a decision they would soon come to regret, as over time the Germans would push for further concessions including the transport of ‘furlough troops’ and ‘destroyer crews’. This was eventually expanded to ‘arms and troops’ by the end of June.

However, the most debated was during the so-called midsummer crisis (Midsommarkrisen) in June 1941, when Germany-who had by now reached an accommodation with Finland and was planning an invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa)-asked to transport a battle-equipped division of military personnel belonging to the Wehrmacht’s 163^rd Infantry Division from Oslo and through Sweden to Haparanda, near the Finnish-Swedish border in Northern Sweden, for further transportation eastward. The Swedish cabinet was divided on the issue and was initially against granting the request, on the basis that it was a violation of Sweden’s neutrality. Heated discussions took place throughout 23 and 24 June. However, the government executed a volte-face when the Swedish Prime Minister, Per Albin Hansson, indicated that King Gustav had informed him that he could not take responsibility for a negative answer and would abdicate unless Germany’s application was granted. He also informed his brother Eugen (who notably distanced himself from the Nazi regime) that the consequences of saying no to the Germans would be serious. Although Swedish historians have continued to debate whether their monarch really threatened to abdicate, it should be noted that on June 25, the Prince of Wied had a long conversation with King Gustav. The German Minister was subsequently pleased to inform the Foreign Ministry in Berlin that Gustav had ‘expressed his satisfaction that the principal German request for the transit of one division had been accepted by the State Council and who indicated his personal support in the matter.’ Indeed, Gustav himself would later reveal ‘that it had been owing only to his personal intervention that the question of the transportation in the summer of troops through Sweden had been settled in accordance with [German] wishes.’

The same afternoon, the first of the trains left Oslo, crossing the border into Sweden early on 26 June, and heading northwards through Sweden en route to Finland and the Eastern Front. As the train arrived at Krylbo, 15 kilometres northwest of Stockholm, the Prince of Wied was present to inspect a guard of honour in the company of his wife. The main transport commenced on 27 June with around four trains crossing into Sweden each day. In total 15,449 German troops were transported by 12 July. Meanwhile, according to Sweden’s Expressen newspaper, over the ensuing wartime years 2,140,000 German soldiers and 100,000 tons of weapons and equipment would be transported through “neutral” Sweden. It should also be noted that on 29 June 1941 cooperation agreements were made between the Swedish and German air forces; as well as between the Swedish and Germany naval forces. Gustav would later indicate to the German Minister that is had only been due to his ‘personal intervention’ that in September 1941, the German 2nd Division, had been permitted to sail through Swedish territorial waters with a Swedish naval escort, en route north to the Eastern Front. The grateful Germans continued to push for more, with Sweden’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact even being mentioned at one stage.

This period sees Gustav and some of his family at their most fawning where Germany is concerned. In November 1941, a smiling Princess Sibylla, with a German army officer at her side, was spotted serving coffee and cake to a group of wounded German soldiers, travelling homeward from Norway, at the Krylbo railway station. It is inconceivable that this was done without the King’s permission; while in February 1942, Gustav would also permit a visit to Stockholm by Sibylla’s father, currently an Obergruppenführer in the German Sturmabteilung (SA). In addition, in October 1941, four months after the German invasion of Soviet Russia, Gustav attempted to send a personal letter to Hitler ‘about a matter that is close to my heart…’ i.e. Bolshevism and offering his ‘sincere thanks to you for deciding to strike at this plague..’ and congratulating the Fuhrer ‘on the results you have already achieved.’ However, the Swedish Prime Minister got wind of it and would not allow the letter to be sent. That the King was a devious operator is evidenced by what he did next: Gustav merely sent for the Prince of Wied on 28 October and read the contents of the letter out aloud to him. The Prince took notes and that very evening, the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin received a copy of the text from the German Embassy in Stockholm: ‘The King wished quite frankly to express his warm thanks to the Fuhrer for having decided to crush this [Bolshevik] plague. The King asked that his heartiest congratulations be conveyed to the Fuhrer on the great success already achieved. At the same time the King gave assurances that by far the greater part of his people shared his views in this matter. His efforts and his activities would always be aimed at converting the doubters to his views. The King also added that he was very anxious for the preservation of good relations between Germany and Sweden.’ Gustav also asked the Prince of Wied ‘to treat the foregoing communication in special confidence so that it would not become known in public. ‘ As a second cousin of Gustav’s late wife, the King still treated the Prince ‘like family’ and he was invited on summer retreats until 1943. It is no wonder that Winston Churchill now viewed Gustav as being, ‘absolutely in the German grip.’ Hitler responded to Gustav’s message, on 7 December, ‘with sincere pleasure’ and particularly mentions ‘the very personal comforting personal attitude of Your Majesty…’ in appreciating the ‘historic action’ which Germany had taken in the war against Bolshevism.

Gustav V and his government were also afraid of the Swedish press upsetting the Germans. Academics have reported that there was ‘very limited reporting’ on the Jewish question in 1940 and 1941 compared to the pre-war years. This self-censorship also extended to at least sixteen Swedish newspapers being prevented from reporting abuses in Norwegian prisons. Expressen cites a case which illustrates that the Swedish King took a personal interest in such matters. When the Gothenburg Trade and Shipping Magazine featured an article by Torgny Segerstedt (an avowed critic of Nazism and Sweden’s policy of appeasement to Hitler) which mentioned Nazi atrocities, Gustaf V summoned the magazine’s editor to the Royal Palace and urged him to stop writing negative articles about Hitler and his regime. Meanwhile, on one occasion, Hitler himself set the record straight, when in an interview with Stockholm Tidningen, in March 1944, he denied that he had made an approach to King Gustav, who had offered to mediate with Finland.

It is easy today to criticise the actions of King Gustav. However, he and his government were clearly under constant pressure for although Sweden remained unoccupied, it remained cut off from the West by German-held territory and was heavily dependent on Germany economically, including for her imports of necessities. Furthermore, the possibility of a German invasion of Sweden was ever-present. At times, the King’s intervention may even have prevented a German incursion, as when he wrote to assure Hitler that ‘Sweden will defend itself against all invaders, even against an English attack…’ This was in response to Hitler’s grumblings that Sweden would not protect itself against a British invasion thus threatening the supply of iron ore on which Germany so desperately relied. Certainly, in April 1942, Hitler decided to strengthen German forces in Norway by 70,000 men. The 25^th Panzer Division was strategically stationed in Oslo and was Germany’s way of intimidating the Swedish government into continued cooperation. By contrast, with the weakening of the German military position in the latter part of 1943 onwards, Gustav’s fear of German reprisals seemed to diminish and he appeared a little more accommodating, although cynics would say that was merely repositioning himself in preparation for an Allied victory. In advance of the Heads of Government Meeting at Tehran in November 1943 some-such as the Russian Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov-were pressing for Sweden to abandon neutrality and fight with the Allies. However, the Swedish Minister in Moscow told the United States Ambassador to Soviet Russia, W. Averell Harriman, that while Sweden was ready to take ‘certain risks,’ his government was not ready to go very far and there was a regal reason :’He pointed out that it was the ambition of the King to lead his people through the war without the suffering that would come from participation.’ Meanwhile, around 7 million tons of iron ore were still being traded between Sweden and Germany in 1944.

As has been observed, Swedish wartime diplomacy sought to ward off German invasion by adopting a neutrality that sacrificed some of Sweden’s independence and made significant concessions to Germany, many backed by the King. Nonetheless, during this period, Gustav V has been credited with helping save Jews deported from Nazi-occupied countries such as Denmark by authorizing measures including the distribution of Swedish passports. Furthermore, in June 1944, at the urging of the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg and the Chief Rabbi in Sofia, Gustav sent a telegram to the Hungarian ‘Regent’, Miklós Horthy, protesting the deportation of Jews from Hungary. This examples a stronger stance than in 1933 when he apparently informed Hitler that the persecution of the Jews initiated by the Nazis would have a disastrous effect on Germany’s international reputation. The Chancellor should ‘proceed more gently.’

At the time of his 85th birthday in 1943 Gustav V made an interesting speech, which indicates his mindset during World War 2, “It is my firm opinion that a constitutional monarch under ordinary circumstances should not act as a leader in one direction or another except in exceptional cases. But during the current great world crisis, I have considered it my indisputable duty to try on several occasions to help the country out of the difficulties of the moment.” With these words, he acknowledges that he certainly had strayed in ‘one direction’ and that was certainly not in the direction of the Allies.

The author of this blog takes a keen interest on the fate of royalty during World War II. He narrates the wartime adventures of the Greek-born Princess Olga (onetime Consort of Prince Regent Paul of Yugoslavia) in Africa (and much else besides).